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INSIDER TRADING IN FLUX: EXPLAINING THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT’S ERROR IN UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN AND THE 
SUPREME COURT’S CORRECTION OF THAT ERROR IN 
UNITED STATES V. SALMAN 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 5, 2015, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
United States v. Newman, making official the most lax laws on insider trading 
the U.S. had ever seen.1 In this modern age of constant information sharing, 
Newman is a landmark decision. Petitioning for the Second Circuit to rehear 
the case, the government admitted that the decision was “one of the most 
significant developments in insider trading law in a generation.”2 For 
approximately two years, the Newman decision was mandatory authority in the 
Second Circuit—the leading circuit in securities law. Newman “dramatically 
limit[ed] the Government’s ability to prosecute some of the most common, 
culpable, and market-threatening forms of insider trading.”3 
So why is Newman such an important case? Imagine your longtime 
childhood friend, Director Dan, is an executive on the board of a Fortune 500 
company. Director Dan, through his capacity on the board, hears about an 
impending merger between his firm and a smaller competitor. Because he is a 
“good friend,” Dan secretly informs you about this coming merger. You are 
not an investor, nor do you have any financial savvy whatsoever, but you 
decide to make stock purchases in Director Dan’s company because you know 
that the merger will soon increase the value of the company substantially. Sure 
enough, news of the merger between Director Dan’s company and its 
competitor rocks the stock market just weeks later. You have quadrupled your 
investment and benefitted lucratively from Dan’s inside information. Is there 
any problem with this? Were Director Dan’s actions illegal? Were your actions 
illegal? Before the Newman decision, the answer to all of these questions was 
undoubtedly, “Yes.” Both your actions and Dan’s actions would have been 
illegal under the Supreme Court’s articulation of the personal benefit 
requirement in Dirks v. S.E.C. because disclosing material, nonpublic 
information to a trading relative or friend was specifically identified as insider 
 
 1. 136 S. Ct. 242, 242 (2015). 
 2. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 22–23, U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 
(2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1837(L)). 
 3. Id. at 3. 
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trading by the Dirks court.4 After Newman, however, the actions by Director 
Dan—although morally repugnant—did not violate insider trading law because 
Dan did not “personally benefit” under the Second Circuit’s new standard.5 
Mere friendship no longer satisfied the personal benefit requirement.6 This 
hypothetical illustrates why some federal prosecutors and others who are tough 
on white-collar crime disagreed with the law made in United States v. 
Newman. Proving a demonstrable quid pro quo between a tipper and a tippee is 
a nearly impossible standard for federal prosecutors to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt.7 The decision created poor law by providing corporate 
insiders with an avenue to disclose inside information to friends with impunity. 
This case note argues that the Second Circuit erred in its decision to make 
the personal benefit requirement a more demanding standard. This note 
examines the heightened standard in great detail and explains why it led to 
frustrated federal prosecutors and, ultimately, corrective action by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Part I begins with a history of the law of insider trading. Part II 
explains how courts interpreted and how federal prosecutors argued the 
personal benefit requirement in the years preceding the Newman decision. Part 
III studies United States v. Newman in great detail. Part IV analyzes how 
courts, especially the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Salman, decided insider 
trading cases in the aftermath of Newman. Finally, Part V argues that Newman 
set bad precedent for many reasons and praises the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Salman as a rebuke of Newman and a reaffirmation of 
Dirks. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING 
Insider trading is a fascinating type of white-collar crime because there is 
no law or statute explicitly prohibiting it.8 Rather, it has traditionally been 
prosecuted criminally as a type of securities fraud under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934’s broad prohibition against using a “device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”9 
 
 4. 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
 5. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Jon Eisenberg, “Friends” Who Trade on Inside Information: How United States v. 
Newman Changes the Law, K&L GATES (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.klgates.com/friends-who-
trade-on-inside-information-how-united-states-v-newman-changes-the-law-04-20-2015/#_edn1 
[http://perma.cc/9ZM6-4EAH]. 
 8. Randall Eliason, Got a Hot Stock Tip? United States v. Newman Clarifies the Law of 
Insider Trading, CASETEXT (July 30, 2015), https://casetext.com/posts/got-a-hot-stock-tip-united-
states-v-newman-clarifies-the-law-of-insider-trading [http://perma.cc/FB5U-TGL5]. 
 9. Security Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1934). This case note focuses 
only on criminal prosecution of insider trading. Insider trading may also result in civil liability for 
violating S.E.C. regulations, but civil liability standards are not the subject of this case note. 
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Since statutory law only provides this general prohibition, insider trading law 
has been left to courts to establish through common law. This Part will discuss 
the landmark cases and theories that have shaped the law of insider trading. 
A. Chiarella v. United States (1980) 
Until 1980, the law of insider trading was muddled. The law did not even 
distinguish between tippers—those who disclose inside information—and 
tippees—those who receive the inside information. In a landmark criminal 
case, Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court finally made that 
distinction by establishing different criminal standards for tippers and 
tippees.10 
In that case, Vincent Chiarella was an employee at a financial printer.11 
Through his employment, he learned of an impending corporate takeover.12 
Without disclosing this knowledge to authorities, he purchased stock in the 
target companies and sold the shares immediately after news of the takeover 
went public.13 He made over $30,000 through these trades.14 Chiarella was 
acquitted of all insider trading criminal charges because he had no duty to 
disclose his inside knowledge.15 Chiarella had no prior dealings with the target 
companies, was not a fiduciary of the companies, and was not a person in 
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.16 “He was, in fact, a 
complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market 
transactions.”17 
The court made an imperative distinction between tippers and tippees in 
this case. The “mere possession of nonpublic market information” does not 
give rise to a duty to publicly disclose the inside information or refrain from 
trading on it, according to the Supreme Court.18 Rather, the duty to publicly 
disclose or refrain from trading arises from “a specific relationship between 
two parties,” such as a corporate insider’s fiduciary duties to shareholders.19 
Chiarella, therefore, was a landmark first step toward a clearer insider trading 
doctrine. Just three years later, the Supreme Court took on another insider 
trading case and issued, arguably, the most important insider trading decision 
ever. 
 
 10. 445 U.S. 222, 228, 230 (1980). 
 11. Id. at 224. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231. 
 16. Id. at 232. 
 17. Id. at 232–33. 
 18. Id. at 235. 
 19. Id. at 233. 
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B. Dirks v. S.E.C. (1983) 
In Dirks v. S.E.C., the Supreme Court adopted the requirement that an 
insider must personally benefit from disclosing nonpublic information in order 
to be liable as a tipper.20 Before the tipper-tippee distinction in Chiarella, 
prosecutors argued that anyone who traded or tipped inside information was 
guilty of securities fraud.21 The Chiarella Court struck down that argument by 
ruling “mere possession of nonpublic market information” does not create a 
duty to publicly disclose or refrain from trading based on the inside 
information.22 Continuing with the tipper-tippee distinction just three years 
later, the Court in Dirks focused tipper liability on whether the insider 
personally benefitted in any way by conveying or trading based on the inside 
information, and it focused tippee liability on the tippee’s knowledge of the 
breach.23 
The law generated by Dirks was groundbreaking, so the background facts 
are especially important. Raymond Dirks was an officer at a broker-dealer 
firm.24 He received material, nonpublic information from a former officer of an 
insurance company that the company’s assets were overstated as a result of 
fraudulent corporate practices.25 Dirks investigated these allegations.26 Neither 
he nor his firm traded any of the company’s stock, but Dirks did discuss the 
allegations with his clients and investors.27 Many clients liquidated their 
holdings in the company because of this information.28 As rumors of the 
alleged fraud spread, the insurance company’s stock plummeted.29 After two 
weeks, insurance authorities finally investigated the company’s records and 
discovered the fraud.30 The S.E.C. censured Dirks civilly because of his role as 
a tippee who did not publicly disclose the inside information.31 The S.E.C. 
argued: “Where ‘tippees’—regardless of their motivation or occupation—come 
into possession of material ‘corporate information that they know is 
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,’ they 
must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from trading.”32 
 
 20. Dirks. v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). 
 21. Eisenberg, supra note 7. 
 22. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. 
 23. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660, 664. 
 24. Id. at 648. 
 25. Id. at 649. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649. 
 29. Id. at 650. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 651–52. 
 32. Id. at 651 (citing 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 230, n. 12 (1980)). 
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In a landmark 6–3 decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Dirks. 
Though Dirks was a tippee, even tippee liability must focus on the benefit the 
insider receives.33 The Court articulated a test for tippee liability: “[T]he test is 
whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative 
breach.”34 Therefore, a tippee is liable for insider trading only if (1) the tipper 
breaches his fiduciary duty (i.e. receives a personal benefit from the disclosure) 
and (2) the tippee “knows or should know” about the tipper’s breach.35 In 
Dirks, the tipper was a former officer of the insurance company who only 
disclosed the inside information to expose the fraud.36 The tipper did not 
receive a personal benefit by disclosing the information, and so he did not 
breach any duty owed to the insurance company’s shareholders.37 “In the 
absence of a breach of duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no 
derivative breach by Dirks.”38 
Thus, the Dirks decision clarified and advanced the law of insider trading. 
The Court characterized tippee liability as “derivative” of the tipper’s breach of 
duty to shareholders, and the Court further explained that a tipper breaches his 
duty to shareholders by personally benefitting from the trade or conveyance of 
inside information.39 Therefore, the ultimate question of fact in insider trading 
cases is whether the tipper personally benefitted from trading or conveying the 
inside information. 
In addition to the law it created in Dirks, the Supreme Court generously 
gave litigators a glimpse of how the Court would determine whether a tipper 
received a personal benefit in future cases. Evidence of a tipper’s monetary 
gain in exchange for the inside information obviously satisfies the personal 
benefit requirement. But many cases will not be so clear-cut. The Court gave 
examples of facts and circumstances in which it would infer a personal benefit: 
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the 
particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading 
by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.40 
 
 33. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 660. 
 36. Id. at 667. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. 
 39. Id. at 662. 
 40. Id. at 664. 
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Therefore, Dirks v. S.E.C. dramatically changed the landscape of insider 
trading. Just three years earlier, before Chiarella, courts did not even 
distinguish between tippers and tippees. After Dirks, courts had well-defined 
tests for establishing both tipper and tippee liability and a generous suggestion 
from the Supreme Court about how to satisfy the personal benefit requirement. 
II.  THE PERSONAL BENEFIT REQUIREMENT POST-DIRKS 
In the years after Dirks, the government successfully argued the personal 
benefit requirement down to a loose, easily-satisfied standard. The Dirks Court 
stated: “The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information 
to a trading relative or friend.”41 Prosecutors seized on that language, citing it 
repeatedly to courts as evidence that a tip to a friend satisfies the personal 
benefit requirement.42 Furthermore, prosecutors pushed to broaden the 
definition of “friend” over the years so that even tips to mere acquaintances 
satisfied the personal benefit requirement.43 
For many years, courts agreed with prosecutors; they applied a loose, 
easily-satisfied personal benefit standard.44 For example, in S.E.C. v. Warde, 
the Second Circuit determined the “close friendship” between the tipper and 
the tippee satisfied the personal benefit requirement.45 
As time passed, courts loosened the standard even more. S.E.C. v. Obus is 
the primary example of a court applying an overly lenient personal benefit 
requirement.46 There, the tipper (Strickland) and tippee (Black) were friends 
from college.47 Citing Dirks, the Obus court found the past relationship 
satisfied the personal benefit requirement.48 “Dirks defined ‘personal benefit’ 
to include making a gift of information to a friend. Here, the undisputed fact 
that Strickland and Black were friends from college is sufficient to send to the 
jury the question of whether Strickland received a benefit from tipping 
Black.”49 
 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. Eisenberg, supra note 7. 
 43. Id. 
 44. United States v. Newman: Second Circuit Ruling Portends Choppier Waters for Insider 




 45. 151 F.3d 42, 48–49 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 46. 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 47. Id. at 291. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (citations omitted). 
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In United States v. Whitman, the expert court on securities law—the 
Southern District of New York—noted how simple it had become to satisfy the 
personal benefit requirement.50 Judge Jed Rakoff stated in his opinion that 
“very little in the way of a ‘benefit’ needed to be shown.”51 He identified just 
how permissive the standard had become: “[T]he benefit does not need to be 
financial or tangible in nature; it could include, for example, maintaining a 
useful networking contact, improving the reputation or power within the 
company, obtaining future financial benefits, or just maintaining or furthering 
a friendship.”52 Whitman illustrated just how loose the personal benefit 
requirement was construed in the years following Dirks. Even a vague 
reputational enhancement or “maintaining a useful networking contact” 
satisfied the standard.53 Creative and talented prosecutors could easily satisfy 
it. 
Thus, prosecutors pushed to loosen the personal benefit requirement since 
the Supreme Court articulated it in Dirks. What began as a lax standard in 
S.E.C. v. Warde relaxed even further over the years. The personal benefit 
requirement unraveled from a required showing of “close friendship” to “mere 
friendship” to “any reputational or networking improvement.” Because the 
requirement collapsed into an easily satisfied test over the years, the defense 
bar called for a stricter standard for prosecutors to meet.54 Insider trading 
defendants typically face significant prison time, so having such a loose 
criminal standard seemed inherently unfair. Others argued the bare 
requirement was bad policy: “The government’s misreading of Dirks would 
fundamentally undermine the policy imperatives that led the Supreme Court to 
adopt the personal benefit test as an important market-protective limit on 
insider trading liability, and would deter valuable analyst-insider 
communications, to the detriment of the market and of all market 
participants.”55 Prosecutors pushed the standard too far. Something had to 
give. 
 
 50. 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (2012). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at n.7. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Mark S. Nelson, Law Profs, Defense Bar Tell Appeals Court to Leave Newman Alone, 
WOLTERS KLUWER (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.dailyreportingsuite.com/securities/news/law_ 
profs_defense_bar_tell_appeals_court_to_leave_newman_alone [http://perma.cc/TEG4-VWTC]. 
 55. Stephen Bainbridge, Supreme Court Denies Cert in US v. Newman Insider Trading 
Tipping Case, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.professorbainbridge. 
com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/10/supreme-court-denies-cert-in-us-v-newman-insider-trad 
ing-tipping-case.html [http://perma.cc/6PW8-3DEL]. 
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III.  UNITED STATES V. NEWMAN 
A. Facts 
Todd Newman (“Newman”) and Anthony Chiasson (“Chiasson”) were two 
high-profile portfolio managers at hedge funds.56 Newman was a portfolio 
manager at Diamondback Capital Management, LLC (“Diamondback”), and 
Chiasson managed accounts at Level Global Investors, L.P. (“Level 
Global”).57 At trial, the Government presented evidence that lower-level 
financial analysts obtained information both directly and indirectly from 
corporate insiders at two publicly traded computer technology companies, Dell 
and NVIDIA.58 
These lower-level analysts obtained reliable information about Dell’s 
earnings numbers before they were publicly released in May 2008 and August 
2008; the analysts also knew NVIDIA’s May 2008 earnings report before it 
was publicly released.59 The analysts passed this inside information along to 
their superiors, Newman and Chiasson, who then executed trades of Dell and 
NVIDIA stock based on this inside information.60 Their hedge funds made 
over $72 million as a result of these trades.61 
The flow of information, or “tipping chain,” is important to analyze the 
Dirks personal benefit requirement in this case. The Dell tipping chain started 
when Rob Ray, a Dell employee in the investor relations department, tipped 
Dell’s earnings information to Sandy Goyal, an analyst at an investment firm.62 
Ray and Goyal were not “close” friends.63 They attended business school 
together and worked together at Dell, but their relationship was strictly 
“work”—Ray sought career advice and networking help from Goyal.64 Goyal 
passed the inside information along to an analyst friend at Diamondback, Jesse 
Tortora.65 Tortora then relayed the information to Newman and to a Level 
Global analyst, Adondakis, who gave the information to Chiasson.66 Thus, 
Newman was three levels removed from the insider (Ray—Goyal—Tortora—
Newman), and Chiasson was four levels removed from the insider (Ray—
Goyal—Tortora—Adondakis—Chiassson).67 
 
 56. U.S. v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 443. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 452. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 443. 
 66. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443. 
 67. Id. 
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The NVIDIA tipping chain was similar. An employee in NVIDIA’s 
finance unit, Chris Choi, gave inside earnings numbers to Hyung Lim.68 Choi 
and Lim were family friends who “had met through church and occasionally 
socialized together.”69 Lim passed along the inside information to analyst 
Danny Kuo.70 Kuo, in turn, passed along the inside NVIDIA numbers to his 
group of analyst friends, including Tortora and Adondakis, who again relayed 
the information to their respective hedge fund managers, Newman and 
Chiasson.71 Therefore, Newman and Chiasson were four levels removed from 
the original tippers in the NVIDIA chain.72 
B. Procedural Posture 
The case had a theatrical beginning. After obtaining a search warrant, FBI 
agents raided the offices of Diamondback and Level Global in November 
2010.73 Both Diamondback and Level Global suffered great reputational and 
financial harm from the raid, and both firms collapsed by the end of 2012 as a 
result.74 
Newman and Chiasson were arrested and charged with securities fraud on 
January 18, 2012, in the Southern District of New York.75 The grand jury 
returned an indictment on February 7, 2012, and so the case proceeded to 
trial.76 With an alleged $72 million in illicit profits, it was one of the largest 
insider trading prosecutions of all time.77 After six days of trial, the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on all counts for both Newman and Chiasson.78 
Newman, who made $4 million in the illegal trades, was sentenced to fifty-four 
months in prison and fined $1 million.79 Chiasson, who made $68 million in 
the illegal trades, was sentenced to seventy-eight months imprisonment and 
was fined $5 million.80 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 452. 
 70. Id. at 443. 
 71. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Roger Parloff, Why the Supreme Court Might Not Hear a Crucial Insider Trading Case, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 23, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/09/23/supreme-court-insider-trading-new 
man/ [http://perma.cc/3F2L-FAK7]. 
 74. GIBSON, supra note 44. 
 75. Id.; United States v. Newman, No. 12 CR 121(RJS), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70242, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2013). 
 76. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443. 
 77. GIBSON, supra note 44. 
 78. Id.; Newman, 773 F.3d at 444. 
 79. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443–44. 
 80. Id. at 443–45. 
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C. The Appeal 
Newman and Chiasson raised several issues on appeal to the Second 
Circuit, but two core issues dramatically changed the legal landscape of insider 
trading: the personal benefit requirement and the tippee’s knowledge 
requirement. 
1. The Personal Benefit Requirement 
As explained in Part II of this case note, the personal benefit requirement 
eroded away after Dirks. In Newman, the insiders at Dell and NVIDIA shared 
material nonpublic information with friends, and so the Government argued 
that this gift of inside information to friends satisfied the personal benefit 
requirement.81 Courts routinely accepted such an argument in the years 
preceding Newman.82 The Second Circuit, however, “emphatically rejected” 
this position in Newman: 
To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be inferred from a 
personal relationship between the tipper and tippee . . . we hold that such an 
inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close 
personal relationship that generates an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature. [T]his requires evidence of a ‘relationship between 
the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an 
intention to benefit the [latter].’83 
This Second Circuit position is a major departure from the post-Dirks 
personal benefit requirement. Although the tipper’s benefit “need not be 
immediately pecuniary,” the personal benefit “must be of some 
consequence.”84 
The required quid pro quo or intention to benefit was not present in 
Newman. Because the tippee, Goyal, only gave the tipper, Ray, minor 
suggestions on a résumé and offered advice before an interview, evidence of a 
personal benefit was scant in the Dell tipping chain.85 Goyal testified that he 
would have given Ray such career advice regardless of the inside information, 
and Ray himself denied that any quid pro quo existed.86 In the NVIDIA chain, 
the Second Circuit described Choi and Lim as “casual acquaintances” that had 
 
 81. Eisenberg, supra note 7. 
 82. See S.E.C. v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 48–49 (2d Cir. 1998); S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 
291 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Whitman, 904 F. Supp. 2d 363, 371 (2012). 
 83. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 453. 
 86. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2016] INSIDER TRADING IN FLUX 127 
no history of personal favors or quid pro quo.87 Therefore, a quid pro quo did 
not exist in Newman, and so the personal benefit requirement was unsatisfied. 
After Newman, the personal benefit requirement was no longer loose and 
prosecution-friendly. It was a stiff burden to satisfy. 
2. Tippee’s Knowledge 
Until the Newman decision, courts—particularly the Second Circuit—were 
“somewhat Delphic” on the law of tippee liability.88 In Dirks, the Supreme 
Court was clear that, even in the presence of a tipper’s breach, a tippee is liable 
only if he “knows or should know that there has been a breach.”89 But must the 
tippee also have knowledge that the tipper personally benefitted from the 
breach? Yes, according to the Newman court.90 The Second Circuit thinks this 
follows naturally from Dirks: 
For purposes of insider trading liability, the insider’s disclosure of confidential 
information, standing alone, is not a breach. Thus, without establishing that the 
tippee knows of the personal benefit received by the insider in exchange for 
the disclosure, the Government cannot meet its burden of showing that the 
tippee knew of a breach.91 
To know that a breach of fiduciary duty occurred, a tippee must have 
knowledge that the original tipper received a personal benefit. The disclosure 
of inside information alone will not necessarily entail the reception of a 
personal benefit.92 “[T]he Supreme Court affirmatively rejected the premise 
that a tipper who discloses confidential information necessarily does so to 
receive a personal benefit.”93 
In Newman, the tippees on trial, Newman and Chiasson, “knew next to 
nothing about the insiders and nothing about what, if any, personal benefit had 
been provided to them.”94 Adondakis, Chiasson’s direct source for the Dell 
information, only told Chiasson that Goyal was “talking to someone within 
Dell,” but mentioned nothing about any personal benefit.95 Also, Adondakis 
did not even tell Chiasson that the source of the NVIDIA information worked 
at NVIDIA.96 Similarly, Tortora—Newman’s direct source for the Dell 
information—did not know how Goyal obtained the Dell numbers, much less 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447. 
 89. Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
 90. Newman, 773 F.3d at 448. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 454. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 453. 
 95. Newman, 773 F.3d at 453. 
 96. Id. 
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whether any personal benefit was involved.97 Nor did Tortora know whether a 
personal benefit was received for the NVIDIA information.98 Because 
Newman and Chiasson did not have knowledge that the original tippers 
received a personal benefit and because the mere disclosure of inside 
information does not entail it, the defendants did not have the requisite 
knowledge to be liable as tippees. 
Therefore, after Newman, the Government had to prove the existence of a 
quid pro quo or other intention that eventually will lead to a pecuniary benefit 
for the insider, and the tippee must have knowledge that the tipper received a 
personal benefit in exchange for the tip.99 
D. Post-Appeal 
After its loss in December 2014, the Government petitioned for rehearing 
en banc by the Second Circuit.100 The petition was denied.101 The Government 
then petitioned for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and certiorari was denied on October 5, 2015.102 Thus, until the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Salman, Newman’s strict personal benefit requirement 
and tippee knowledge requirement were controlling precedent in the Second 
Circuit. 
IV.  UNITED STATES V. SALMAN: HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND OTHER 
COURTS REACTED TO NEWMAN 
Many people feared the Newman decision would greatly hinder the 
government’s ability to prosecute insider trading. The government itself 
claimed the decision would “dramatically limit the Government’s ability to 
prosecute some of the most common, culpable, and market-threatening forms 
of insider trading.”103 Judges, however, interpreted Newman surprisingly 
narrowly after the decision in December 2014.104 “A Wall Street Journal 
analysis of more than twenty cases shows that, so far, defendants in federal 
court who have tried to use the [Newman] opinion in their defense have failed 
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in every instance but one.”105 Since that analysis, numerous other courts 
distinguished or otherwise declined to follow Newman.106 
An important critique of Newman came in July 2015 in the Ninth Circuit 
decision United States v. Salman.107 There, the Ninth Circuit declined to 
follow Newman’s articulation of the personal benefit requirement, creating a 
“circuit split” between the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit—the two most 
influential jurisdictions in securities law.108 
A. Facts 
Salman was a family-based insider trading scheme.109 The fraud originated 
from an insider, Maher Kara, who worked in Citigroup’s healthcare investment 
banking group.110 Maher discussed various aspects of his job with his older 
brother, Michael Kara.111 Michael had an undergraduate degree in chemistry, 
so Maher—at first—only sought help from Michael in understanding concepts 
relevant to his investment work in the healthcare and biotechnology sectors.112 
The brotherly tutor session, however, quickly evolved into an illegal disclosure 
of material nonpublic information. 
From late 2004 through early 2007, Maher “regularly disclosed to Michael 
information about upcoming mergers and acquisitions of and by Citigroup 
clients.”113 In 2003, before the disclosures, Maher got engaged to Suzie 
Salman.114 As the Kara and Salman families became friends during this 
engagement, Michael Kara became especially close with Suzie’s brother, 
Bassam Yacoub Salman (“Salman”)—the defendant in this case.115 Michael 
told Salman that he was receiving inside investment information from Maher, 
and Michael encouraged Salman to “mirror-imag[e]” his trading activity.116 
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Salman traded through a brokerage account held by his brother-in-law, 
Bayyouk.117 From 2004 to 2007, “Bayyouk and Michael Kara executed nearly 
identical trades in securities issued by Citigroup clients shortly before the 
announcement of major transactions. As a result of these trades, Salman and 
Bayyouk’s account grew from $396,000 to approximately $2.1 million.”118 
B. Procedural Posture 
Salman was found guilty by a jury on four counts of securities fraud and 
one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud; he was sentenced to three 
years in prison.119 Salman appealed his conviction, but he did not challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence.120 While Salman’s appeal was pending, the 
Second Circuit announced its Newman decision.121 Salman then filed a 
supplemental brief arguing that the evidence in his case was insufficient under 
the new personal benefit requirement in Newman.122 The Ninth Circuit granted 
the appeal.123 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Analysis 
With great irony, Judge Jed Rakoff, a U.S. District Court Judge in the 
Southern District of New York, wrote the decision while working as a visiting 
judge in the Ninth Circuit.124 Rakoff is widely considered the nation’s leading 
jurist on securities law and insider trading, so his opinion is highly regarded.125 
Furthermore, he has a notorious “pro-defendant” reputation.126 He has been 
called “a burr in the side of lawyers for the Justice Department and Securities 
and Exchange Commission.”127 In Salman, however, Rakoff critiqued his own 
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“home circuit” by arguing the Newman court erred by putting too heavy a 
burden on the government to prosecute insider trading.128 
Because of the new personal benefit requirement articulated in Newman, 
Salman argued the familial relationship between Maher and Michael in his 
case was insufficient, standing alone, to satisfy the standard.129 Salman argued 
that Maher, the tipper, needed to receive a benefit of “at least a potential gain 
of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” to satisfy Newman’s personal 
benefit requirement.130 Because Maher did not receive any tangible benefit by 
disclosing the inside information to his brother, Salman argued that the 
government failed to satisfy the personal benefit requirement.131 Under the 
Newman standard, Salman almost certainly had a winning argument. 
Much to Salman’s dismay, the Ninth Circuit flatly rejected the Second 
Circuit’s new articulation of the personal benefit requirement.132 “To the extent 
Newman can be read to go so far, we decline to follow it.”133 The Salman court 
based its disagreement on the personal benefit requirement’s roots in Dirks.134 
“[Following Newman] would require us to depart from the clear holding of 
Dirks that the element of breach of fiduciary duty is met where an ‘insider 
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’”135 The 
Salman court even went a step further, criticizing the Second Circuit for 
creating ill-advised policy and an environment where “a corporate insider or 
other person in possession of confidential and proprietary information would 
be free to disclose that information to her relatives, and they would be free to 
trade on it, provided only that she asked for no tangible compensation in 
return.”136 
After declining to follow Newman, the Salman court found the Dirks 
personal benefit requirement easily satisfied.137 Maher disclosed inside, 
market-sensitive information to his brother, Michael, with the intention of 
benefitting Michael.138 Maher himself testified at trial that he disclosed the 
inside information “for the purpose of benefitting and providing for his brother 
Michael.”139 
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit critiqued and split from the Second Circuit because 
Newman directly conflicted with and “depart[ed] from” the Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Dirks.140 
D. Post-Appeal 
After his loss in the Ninth Circuit, Salman petitioned to the United States 
Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari.141 Salman presented this question to the 
highest court: 
Does the personal benefit to the insider that is necessary to establish insider 
trading under Dirks v. S.E.C. require proof of “an exchange that is objective, 
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature,” as the Second Circuit held in United States v. 
Newman, or is it enough that the insider and the tippee shared a close family 
relationship, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?142 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued its decision on December 
6, 2016, striking down Newman’s heightened personal benefit requirement.143 
V.  BAD LAW: THE SECOND CIRCUIT GOT NEWMAN WRONG AND THE 
SUPREME COURT WAS CORRECT TO ABROGATE IT IN SALMAN 
A. Practical Problems with the Tippee Knowledge Requirement 
Recall from Part III that, in addition to heightening the personal benefit 
requirement, Newman intensified the tippee’s knowledge requirement by 
requiring a tippee to have knowledge of the original tipper’s personal benefit 
from the disclosure.144 Such a knowledge requirement drastically limits tippee 
liability. 
Technological innovations such as texting, Facebook, and Twitter allow 
instantaneous message sharing. In this age of instant communication, inside 
information can easily spread to numerous “downstream recipients” within 
several minutes of the insider’s disclosure. In fact, most modern-day cases of 
insider trading occur through “tippee chains” like those in Newman and 
Salman—an insider tells a friend who tells a friend who trades. Preventing 
tippee chains and downstream trading is more important than ever. 
Prosecuting tippee chains, however, is nearly impossible under Newman’s 
knowledge requirement. “[R]emote tippees are unlikely to even know the 
tipper’s identity, let alone whether the tipper actually received a benefit in 
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exchange for his tip.”145 Links in the tippee chain are highly unlikely to tell 
one another about the original tipper’s personal benefit received for the initial 
disclosure. Tippees only care about cashing in on the inside information; they 
do not care about the personal benefit received by the original tipper. In fact, 
not knowing about the tipper’s personal benefit is actually preferred because 
the tippee then has plausible deniability as to the knowledge requirement. 
Newman’s heightened tippee knowledge requirement fails to acknowledge 
the realities of twenty-first century information sharing and therefore leaves 
downstream tippees insulated from liability. 
B. Newman Directly Conflicts with Dirks 
In Part I, this case note discussed Dirks in great detail.146 The Supreme 
Court gave two distinct scenarios in which the personal benefit requirement is 
satisfied: 
For example, there may be a relationship between the insider and the recipient 
that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the 
particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of 
nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading 
by the insider himself followed by a gift of profits to the recipient.147 
The Court’s deliberate use of the language “also exist” makes clear the two 
separate occasions on which a personal benefit may be inferred: (1) when the 
insider expects something in return for the information or (2) when the insider 
“gives a gift” of information to a friend or relative.148 The second occasion is 
vitally important here. 
Webster’s Dictionary defines “gift” as “something that is voluntarily 
transferred by one person to another without compensation.”149 Thus, under the 
plain meaning of “gift” in Dirks, a personal benefit may be inferred from the 
mere disclosure of material nonpublic information to a trading friend or 
relative—no compensation or receipt of a gain is required. 
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Newman, however, “hold[s] that such an inference is impermissible in the 
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates 
an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential 
gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”150 Requiring “an exchange 
that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain . . .” 
directly conflicts with Dirks because an “exchange” is, by definition, not a 
“gift.”151 An “exchange” involves “giving or taking one thing in return for 
another [thing],” meanwhile a “gift” involves giving something for nothing in 
return.152 Under Newman, “Dirks’s two categories of personal benefit are 
collapsed into one—and the entire ‘gift’ discussion in Dirks becomes 
superfluous.”153 Newman eliminates the Supreme Court’s second inference of 
a personal benefit, thereby redefining the personal benefit requirement. 
The Ninth Circuit agrees that Newman’s personal benefit requirement 
inherently conflicts with the Supreme Court’s articulation of the requirement in 
Dirks.154 “[Following Newman] would require us to depart from the clear 
holding of Dirks that the element of breach of fiduciary duty is met where an 
‘insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.’”155 
The Second Circuit had no authority to redefine the personal benefit 
requirement crafted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Nevertheless, 
the Second Circuit “substituted its novel and imprecise legal rules for the 
‘guiding principle’ that [the] Court carefully fashioned for factfinders in 
Dirks.”156 It therefore overreached and set bad precedent in Newman. 
C. The Ninth Circuit and Other Influential Courts Disagree 
Before rejecting Newman as bad law, the Salman court pointed out that, 
although the Second Circuit is not binding on the Ninth Circuit, the court 
“would not lightly ignore the most recent ruling of our sister circuit in an area 
of law that it has frequently encountered.”157 In the two years proceeding 
Newman, most courts followed the lead of the Ninth Circuit: eight courts 
distinguished Newman and three courts declined to extend it.158 Three other 
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courts—including the Ninth Circuit in Salman—flatly rejected Newman by 
declining to follow it.159 The courts that were most hostile to Newman were the 
most influential jurisdictions in securities law: the Southern District of New 
York (New York City), the Northern District of California (San Francisco), 
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.160 Since the Second Circuit’s decision 
in December 2014, only one defendant had success using Newman in his 
defense.161 
The unwillingness of courts to employ and extend Newman illustrates the 
uneasiness that judges and juries felt toward the decision. As this case note 
explained in Part IV, the Ninth Circuit split from Newman, calling the decision 
a “depart[ure] from the clear holding of Dirks . . .”162 Other courts also were 
hesitant to conflict with Dirks. In April 2015, before issuing the Salman 
decision, Judge Rakoff first hinted at Newman’s conflict with Dirks: 
“[w]hether this is the required reading of Dirks may not be obvious . . .”163 
Newman’s hostile reception by other courts specializing in securities law 
illustrates it was bad law that needed to be changed. 
D. Newman is Bad Policy 
Newman’s rationale creates bad policy in two interrelated ways: it 
undermines fundamental fairness, which thereby erodes public confidence in 
the securities markets. 
First and most importantly, the Newman decision undermines notions of 
fundamental fairness. As this note argued previously in Part V, the heightened 
tippee knowledge requirement makes tippee chains and downstream trading 
impossible to prosecute for all practicable purposes.164 Tippees, through no 
hard work of their own but merely by virtue of being friends or relatives with 
the right insiders, can benefit lucratively with impunity by trading based on 
inside information. Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of 
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New York, described Newman as “a potential bonanza for friends and family 
of rich people with access to material nonpublic information.”165 Newman is 
unfair to legitimate analysts and honest investors who do not have access to 
such nonpublic information. The decision discourages diligent financial 
analysis and, instead, incentivizes choosing the right “golf buddies.” 
This blatant unfairness destroys public confidence in the integrity of the 
securities markets. 
Such activity [] strips investors of confidence that the markets are fair and 
open. While some ‘informational disparity is inevitable in the securities 
markets,’ a rational investor will ‘hesitate to venture capital’ in a rigged 
game—one in which he faces a systematic ‘informational disadvantage’ vis-à-
vis insiders and their chosen beneficiaries that can never ‘be overcome with 
research or skill.’166 
Newman indeed reduces the securities markets to a “rigged game” by 
making tippee liability impossible to prosecute for all practicable purposes; 
corporate insiders and their friends can trade with impunity on inside 
information.167 Senator Jack Reed warned Congress that the injustice advanced 
in Newman dangerously shakes citizens’ faith in government.168 Reed said, 
“[Newman] defies common sense . . . [s]uch a decision is one of many that has 
caused too many of our citizens to lose faith in government and our courts.”169 
If the law permits such favoritism, it risks destroying all public confidence in 
securities markets, and once lost, public confidence is extremely difficult to 
earn back. 
E. A Controversial Decision 
Although Part IV noted that only one defendant in 2015 successfully used 
Newman in his defense,170 other statistics indicate Newman was wreaking 
havoc on prosecution of insider trading defendants in different ways. “Justice 
Department officials [state] that the ruling is having an impact in unseen ways, 
including on investigations they say they have had to abandon as a result.”171 
In the years immediately preceding Newman, Preet Bharara (“Bharara”) 
was aggressively pursuing insider trading cases.172 He had an impeccable track 
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record with over eighty convictions and only one acquittal.173 But because of 
the heightened requirements promulgated by Newman, law enforcement 
officials were forced to rein in insider trading investigations.174 In addition, 
“[f]ederal prosecutors in New York also [were] forced to stall or back off 
insider trading investigations that lack evidence of an obvious benefit provided 
to the tipper.”175 For example, on October 23, 2015, Bharara was forced to 
dismiss charges against former SAC Capital portfolio manager Michael 
Steinberg who had been convicted by a federal jury—and sentenced to three 
and a half years in prison—in an insider trading scheme that generated more 
than $1.8 million in profits.176 Because of the burdensome requirements set 
forth in Newman, Bharara said, “insisting on maintaining guilty pleas in these 
cases wouldn’t be in the interests of justice.”177 Thus, since the decision over 
two years ago, Newman wreaked havoc on insider trading investigations and 
prosecutions. 
In addition to law enforcement officials, Congress was also outraged by 
the Newman decision. Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Salman 
to clarify the law of insider trading, several congressional leaders already had 
proposed bills to overturn Newman and to more harshly crack down on insider 
trading.178 In immediate response to Newman, Stephen F. Lynch introduced a 
bill to the House of Representatives on February 27, 2015, seeking to 
completely eliminate the personal benefit requirement as an element of insider 
trading.179 The bill, entitled the Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, proposed 
eliminating the personal benefit requirement altogether by making it unlawful 
to trade “based on information that the person knows or, considering factors 
including financial sophistication, knowledge of and experience in financial 
matters, position in a company, and amount of assets under management, 
should know is material information and inside information.”180 The proposal 
goes far beyond merely overturning Newman; it seeks to vastly broaden the 
activities falling under the illegal purview of insider trading. Senator Jack Reed 
introduced a separate bill, the Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, in the Senate 
just weeks later.181 This bill makes it illegal to trade “on the basis of material 
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information that the person knows or has reason to know is not publicly 
available . . . [T]he term ‘not publicly available’ shall not include information 
that the person has independently developed from publicly available 
sources.”182 This proposal is much less expansive than the House bill, but it 
still seeks to overturn Newman and eliminate profiting from blatant 
information asymmetry. Both bills are in their earliest stages, only having been 
introduced and sent to the Finance Committee, but they “signify Congressional 
dissatisfaction with the Second Circuit’s decision.”183 
F. The Future of Insider Trading Law 
1. The Supreme Court’s Abrogation of Newman and Reaffirmation of 
Dirks 
Newman is a bad decision for the many reasons stated in this case note; 
therefore, the Supreme Court was correct in abrogating—or at least drastically 
limiting—the Second Circuit’s decision. 
The Supreme Court Justices’ skeptical questions during Salman oral 
arguments on October 5, 2016 foreshadowed that the Court would overturn 
Newman and reaffirm the Dirks standard.184 Salman’s attorney, Alexandra 
Shapiro, “immediately ran into a string of skeptical questions from the justices, 
mainly about her argument for a significant change in the law, which has been 
well settled for over 30 years.”185 Justice Elena Kagan was particularly 
deferential to Dirks’s gift theory and hostile to Salman’s argument in support 
of Newman: 
You’re asking us to cut back significantly from something that we said several 
decades ago [in Dirks], something that Congress has shown no indication that 
it’s unhappy with, and in a context in which, I mean, obviously the integrity of 
the markets are a very important thing for this country. And you’re asking us 
essentially to change the rules in a way that threatens that integrity.186 
Justice Stephen Breyer was also hostile to the Newman approach. He 
supported the “gift” rationale articulated in Dirks: “[W]hy are the statute books 
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filled with instances where the public wants to know, not just how you might 
benefit, but how your family might benefit? . . . Because they think very often, 
though it depends on families, to help a close family member is like helping 
yourself.”187 
In its decision, the Court indeed abandoned Newman’s rationale and 
reverted to Dirks’s gift theory “which easily resolve[d] the narrow issue” 
presented in the Salman case.188 Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for 
a unanimous Court.189 “Our discussion of gift giving resolves this case . . . 
Dirks makes clear that a tipper breaches a fiduciary duty by making a gift of 
confidential information to ‘a trading relative,’ and that rule is sufficient to 
resolve the case at hand.”190 Most importantly, the Court expressly overturned 
Newman’s heightened personal benefit requirement: “To the extent the Second 
Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or 
similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends, we agree 
with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”191 
Justice Alito could have used Salman to propound a thorough insider 
trading doctrine, particularly by identifying and clarifying instances in which 
an insider personally benefits from disclosing confidential information; 
instead, the Court exercised judicial restraint, deciding only the very narrow 
issue it faced. Near the end of the opinion, the Court acknowledged that 
“[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a particular 
disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts.”192 The Court, 
however, “punted” the opportunity to clarify and advance the personal benefit 
requirement. “[T]here is no need for us to address those difficult cases today, 
because this case involves ‘precisely the ‘gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative’ that Dirks envisioned.’”193 
Therefore, the Supreme Court rightfully used Salman to correct the Second 
Circuit’s error in Newman and reinstate Dirks as the clear standard for the 
personal benefit requirement. 
2. Perhaps Congress Should Weigh In 
Although the Supreme Court laudably overturned Newman’s strict 
personal benefit requirement, difficult questions of whether an insider 
personally benefits from a disclosure will undoubtedly arise in the future. The 
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Court could have—but unfortunately didn’t—provided clarification of the 
vague personal benefit standard. 
Because Congress has forever shirked its duty in this area of law, perhaps 
it is time for legislators to statutorily define and incriminate insider trading. 
When introducing the Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act to the Senate, Senator 
Jack Reed summed up the problem that has been created by the common law: 
“The need for this legislation is long overdue because, in the absence of a 
statutory definition, an inconsistent and complicated body of common law has 
developed as the courts have used varying interpretations of anti-fraud statutes 
in order to decide insider trading cases.”194 Even Judge Barrington Parker of 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted during Newman’s oral argument 
that “the government’s position on key points of the law seems to vary based 
depending on which judge you’re talking to.”195 Professor Thomas Lee Hazen 
from the University of North Carolina School of Law summarized the effect of 
congressional inaction best: “[V]irtually everyone is now in agreement that 
we’d be a lot better off if Congress would simply bite the bullet and define 
[insider trading] . . . the situation is a mess. That’s how you end up with cases 
like Newman.”196 
Thus, leaving insider trading doctrine to common law led to confusion and 
uncertainty. Despite the Supreme Court’s recent rebuke of Newman, it may be 
time for Congress to provide certainty by fashioning a clear definition and 
prohibition of “insider trading”—one that endorses Dirks’s gift theory as 
reaffirmed in Salman. Although it may be mere political grandstanding, the 
reader should watch for legislative response to recent years of insider trading 
confusion. 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit erred by creating a stricter personal benefit 
requirement and tippee knowledge requirement for insider trading cases. 
Newman heightened the personal benefit test to a required showing of quid pro 
quo or at least “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at 
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”197 
Furthermore, for a tippee to be liable, Newman required showing a tippee had 
knowledge of the insider’s personal benefit from the disclosure. 
The case directly conflicts with the Supreme Court in Dirks by collapsing 
the carefully fashioned two-prong personal benefit test into a mere quid pro 
quo requirement. The strict tippee knowledge requirement does not comport 
with reality because details of the insider’s personal benefit do not get passed 
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down the tippee chain. Thus, tippee liability is impossible to prosecute for all 
practicable purposes. Newman furthermore sets perverse policy incentives by 
undermining fundamental fairness and eroding public confidence in the 
securities markets. Finally, the landmark decision wreaked havoc on insider 
trading investigations and prosecutions during the two years it served as 
controlling precedent in the Second Circuit. Preet Bharara was forced to drop 
charges in the high-profile SAC Capital insider trading scheme as a result of 
Newman, and the Department of Justice abandoned many other investigations. 
Recently in Salman, the Ninth Circuit split from Newman, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the befuddled state of insider 
trading law. On December 6, 2016, the Court unanimously overturned 
Newman’s personal benefit test and endorsed Dirks’s gift theory as controlling 
law. Although the Court correctly decided Salman and took the important first 
step of abrogating Newman, it refused to elaborate on the personal benefit 
standard or address more difficult personal benefit cases. Meanwhile, criminal 
defendants face significant prison time because of the common law’s 
vagueness. Salman is the correct first step; now Congress should consider 
promulgating a clear insider trading doctrine. 
For all the reasons stated in this case note, the Second Circuit erred in 
United States v. Newman. The Supreme Court of the United States rightfully 
used United States v. Salman to correct the error by overturning Newman and 
reaffirming Dirks. Perhaps it is time for Congress to statutorily define and 
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